Interconnectivity between web systems and sensor networks is useful to provide smart services for the Internet of Things. These services are based on data collection and processing to obtain useful information about the supervised environment. Using this information it is possible to provide smart services, but some of them must be considered as protected by the legislation regarding privacy of personal data. In order to face this issue, security and privacy mechanisms must be used. So as to deal with the limited resources in sensor networks, these mechanisms must be as lightweight as possible to preserve the enough Quality of Service. However, these mechanisms must fulfill security and privacy requirements defined by the regulations. This paper describes a Wireless Body Area Network application providing services to protect firefighters work in hazardous environments. The firefighter wears a special shirt with sensors embedded. These sensors are able to monitor not only the firefighter health status, but also they can be connected to external sensors in order to monitor the health status of the victims. These external sensors are part of the equipment carried by the firefighter to face the emergencies and save lives. Finally, using this solution they are able to obtain external medical aid.
Introduction
In this paper we propose a service to protect firefighters and victims by means of a Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) used by the fire brigades in hazardous environments. It is based on a special shirt with sensors embedded that are able to monitor the firefighter health status. In addition, these wearable sensors can be connected to external sensors in order to monitor the health status of the victims. The external sensors are part of the equipment carried by the firefighter in order to obtain external medical aid so as to provide a safe rescue procedure to victims. The basic structure of the service is depicted in Figure 1 where the key elements are included. There are two different actuations roles. The first one is the "rescue team", where each firefighter carries a wearable sensor to gather the vital health parameters [1] and act as a cluster head for the sensors placed on the victims found. The cluster heads are able to assist each other, and all cluster heads can find the best route to the gateway, either directly or via cluster heads neighborhood. Thus, the health status of all the persons involved in the rescue (firefighters and victims) is controlled by medical staff, giving the appropriate directions oriented to save their lives. The second role is the "support team", which receives and identifies the victims, and carries them to a safe place. 
Analysis of the Requirements Regarding Security Privacy and Trust on Data Gathered
As presented in the 2014 conference paper titled "Automatic System for Providing Security Services in the Internet of Things applications over Wireless Sensor Networks" [2] , the security and privacy protections are regulated by laws [3] . In the case of Spanish and European regulations the trend is to construct a DPIA-T (Data Protection Impact Assessment -Template) [4] for each service. Previously, it is necessary to know some high level information about the service called Utility Matrix in [2] , which is divided in two groups as we can see in Table 1 where both the service and the network type that supports the services are defined. The security and privacy imperatives in DPIA-T format [4] are as follows: 1-Data related health status is considered as personal data that must be protected. 2-Data must be as fresh as possible and true. 3-Critical data for safety the life are priority. The legal imperatives over sensitive information are structured as shown in Table 2 , and the specific protections to data set are assigned in the Table 3 . Table 2 . Legal imperatives in DPIA-T format.
DPIA-T : Firefighter and victims protecting solution. Security service Attack Target Defence
Availability DoS 1-The physical layer is degraded and the communication among nodes is impossible (jamming). 2-A spurious node starts sending malicious data packets to the network.
It must be known the situation for to face it.
Authentication Sybil A node is asking for multiple IDs, and if the attack succeeds, the node is able to subvert the trust mechanism.
Restore trust mechanism rejecting the malicious node.
Node replication
When a node ID is copied, replicated in a new node, and then introduced in the network. From that moment on, the network accepts the node with the cloned ID as an authorized node.
Realize and revoke the malicious node.
False node
It introduces data traffic in the network to avoid legitimate nodes to communicate (injecting false data messages, claiming for authorization continuously, etc.).
Identify the false node and discard all messages.
Integrity
Message corruption
When a message reaches the recipient with a different content than the one sent by the source. This situation is either because the message has been degraded in the transmission, or because the message has been intercepted and intentionally changed.
Ensure that messages have not been altered.
Privacy Eavesdropping
Other devices listening in the same frequency may intercept every communication between two nodes.
Provide authentication and ciphering capabilities. Use data anonymization. Node subversion When a node is captured and cryptoanalyzed the secret keys, node ID, security policies, and so forth are disclosed.
Use few data stored in each node and renew the keys. Regarding security services and mechanisms designed for this type of service and network, the expert system module TSES knowledge base [2] was already defined (among many others) and the SensoTrust proposal security structure [5] has been chosen, which is based on trust domains definition where each of them has a common security policy [6, 7] . Two trust domains have been defined: one for the rescue team (Domain 1) and the other for the firefighter support team (Domain 2), selecting the Domain Key Servers (as presented in SensoTrust proposal [5] in both domains using the cluster head nodes. Once the protections to data regarding the service have been assigned, the expert system [2] must find the appropriate mechanisms in its knowledge base to face the attacks mentioned in DPIA-T. As already presented in Table 3 , there are two major types of security and privacy requirements. After applying the legal imperatives (DPIA-T) to the current case, the following list of security and privacy mechanisms appears, taking into account that it can be applied as the common scheme indicated (key distributed, roles and trust policies) in SensoTrust [5] . Trust domain policies are shown in Table 4 . Countermeasures against outsider attacks are based on authentication, and the countermeasures against insider attacks are based on the security policies and the trust domains. 
Sybil
In The security scheme, every node ID is preconfigured for each node and only the Security Manager (out of the WSN) has the complete list of the IDs. In extremis, it is possible to perform a node revocation.
Node replication
The Node ID is stored in an external entity (SM) that controls all the IDs working in the network. Security policy, if the SM detects that 2 nodes are operating with the same ID, a node revocation protocol is issued, and the node is dropped from the network.
False node Using the node ID, the schema is able to identify the false node and, using the domain key renewal functionality, all the messages sent by this node will be discarded.
Integ. Message corruption
To avoid both issues, security schema includes the ciphering suite functionality, which allows performing a message hash (using MD5, SHA1, etc.).
Priv.
Eavesdropping -
To avoid data disclosure, It provides both symmetric and PKI ciphering capabilities. Anonymization, unlink the personal identification and his/her measure data Node subversion -To avoid it is to minimize the cryptographic and security information stored in each node. Nevertheless, all the keys in the network can be renewed.
Results and Discussion
To preserve the Quality of Service (QoS) it is necessary to know the restrictions. Sensors 1-3 (firefighter and victims) have as critical requirements both battery consumption and delay, but this does not applies to sensor 4 (Firefighters victim Support). The results obtained in laboratory tests are presented in Figure 2 . Finally, it is necessary that the system provides reports about both the anomalies found (attack detections as a result of true positives, true negatives, false positives and false negatives) and their reactions. The reporting to BES and TSES is composed by: 1-no legislation-based impact attacks; 2-seriousness of the impacts; 3-legislation-based impact and 4-alarm report.
Reporting to LES is composed by legislation-based impact and improvement plan report. Some indicators [8] 
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a service able to protect firefighters and victims using a Wireless Body Area Network ported by the fire brigades in hazardous environments.
In order to protect the Quality of Service of the system and fulfill the security and privacy requirements requested by laws it is necessary to provide a tailored security and privacy solution [2] . The security structure and the mechanisms to apply must be as lightweight as possible [6, 7] . In the presented use case of this solution, the expert system proposed in our last conference paper selected SensoTrust proposal [5] as one of the best solutions to build the security and privacy solution. It is also necessary to monitor service performance both in the resource consumption and the protection offered.
So as to provide a continuous service enhancement, it is necessary to implement an adequate strategy of supervision over the key performance indicators. This supervision must be established over the quality of the equipment involved (hardware, software and communication among them), the quality of service (functionality) and the quality of security and protection (security services and mechanisms). All of them must be analyzed together in order to obtain the desired results.
